THE POWER OF A PARTNER TO CONFESS JUDGMENT
AGAINST THE PARTNERSHIP IN PENNSYLVANIA.
Very early in this jurisdiction, Shippen, P. J., struck off the
judgment, as to the non-assenting partner, on the ground that
commercial expedience did not require that any one of the partners should have the implied authority to confess judgment
against the partnership,' and his conclusion was subsequently upheld by Chief Justice Gibson. 2 And so run a long unbroken line
of decisions for more than a century 3 until the Supreme Court
decided the case of Boyd v. Thompson and Coxe, 4 in which the
court apparently holds that while the non-assenting partner is
not liable individually, the partnership itself is liable. This doctrine was new to the law and to substantiate such a conclusion,
the court introduced the "entity" theory of partnership. They
treated the partnership as a distinct "creature," separate and
apart from the personality of the individuals constituting such
partnership, the effect of which appeared to overrule the earlier
decisions of Judge Shippen and Chief Justice Gibson.
If the introduction of the "entity" theory in Boyd v. Thompson and Coxe had rested with that case and gone no further, then,
perhaps, we would have had good grounds to consider the earlier
cases of Girardv. Basse,5 Bitzer v. Shunk 6 and Harperv. Fox 7
as overruled. But we have the subsequent cases of Guckert v.
Hacke8 and Bank v. Crowell," in which the court held that
the only way in which a partnership could relieve the separate
'Girard v. Basse, I Dallas, iig (1784).
Bitzer v. Shunk, I W. & S. 340 (1841), and Harper v. Fox, 7 W. & S.
142 (1844).
3
Down to McCleary v. Thompson, 130 Pa. 443 (1889). And it mattered
little whether the partnership was indebted or not.
' 153 Pa. 78 (1893), and affirmed the same year in Franklin v. Morris,
154 Pa. 152.
' Supra, note i.
"Supra, note 2.
'Supra, note
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Pa.303 (1893).
171 Pa. 313 (0896).
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members from individual liability is by conforming strictly with
the Incorporation Act of 1874.10 That is, a partnership carries
with it the mantle of unlimited liability upon the shoulders of
the separate individuals. And to divorce this partnership from
such liability, the members of such partnership must conform
strictly with the conditions imposed upon them by the legislature,
which means that the "entity" is a legislative and not a judicial
creation, and that the court is assuming upon the powers of the
legislature when it attempts to create this separate "entity."
The decision of Boyd v. Thompson and Coxe was influenced
by the conclusion of Justice Sharswood in Schmerz v. Schreeve,"
where it was decided that one partner could bind the partnership
under a sealed instrument, if such partner had the implied authority to enter into such a contract. In that case, the seal would
not vitiate a perfectly valid instrument. From this, the court, in
Boyd v. Thompson and Coxte concluded that a partner had the
authority to bind the partnership by any instrument whatsoever
under seal. Therefore, he could bind the partnership by a confession of judgment under seal. And this, notwithstanding the
fact that at common law, no seal was necessary to confess judg-

inent. 12
The controlling feature in the minds of the judges appeared
to be the fact that the confession of judgment was under seal.
It seems that the more important qtiestion, whether the partner
has the implied authority to confess such a judgment, was overlooked. Justice Sharswood laid especial emphasis upon the inherent or implied powers of which a partnership is endowed
and limited his decision expressly to such conditions. A careful
examination of the facts show that one partner entered into a
contract "under seal," and in the firm name for the purchase of
oil to be used in the partnership business. A contract of sale
for the purchase of merchandise used by the co-partnership is
clearly within the implied powers of the co-partnership, and,
an act separate and distinct from the confession of judgment, as
30P. L. 73.
"62 Pa. 457 (1869).

"2 First National Bank of Hazleton v. Kintz,

24

Pa. Sup. Ct. 456 (i9o4).
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decided by Chief Justice Gibson.' 3 To that extent, Justice Sharswood's decision in Schinerz v. Schreeze 14 is in line with all the
decisions up to that time, and in fact, really does not take up
the question of confession of a partnership judgment. The
seeming error of the court in Boyd v. Thompson and Coxre lies
in the fact that it gave to the decision in Schinerz v. Schrecve, a
much wider scope and meaning than Justice Sharswood really intended it to convey.
The court's opinion in Boyd v. Thompson and Co.re created
considerable confusion in subsequent decisions. The Supreme
Court is reluctant to follow this case and yet it is fettered to its
conclusions. It is this feeling that causes the present undefined
condition of the law on this subject. Especially is this true in
dealing with the question of the distribution of such a fund. Onl
the face of it, Boyd v. Thompson and Coxe would seem clearly
wrong, but we venture that this is more apparent than real. As
a matter of fact, the case is correct in its conclusion, but the decision must be sustained upon other grounds than that set out by
the court. The real effect of the decision is, that for the purposes of execution, it sustains the judgment against the partnership, even though it exempts the non-assenting partner. Thus the
court laid down a rule of practice confusing it with the more
important question of substantive law by volunteering a reason
for the former at the neglect of the latter. But fortunately, while
the reasoning was in error, the conclusion was correct, as the
same question had already been similarly decided in Knieb v.
Graves,1 an earlier case, but not upon the "entity" theory, for
there the court said:
"Nothing can be plainer than that the execution must follow the judgment and be warranted by it. And whether the
execution corresponds with the judgment and is warranted by it
or not, depends upon the nature and form of the judgment and
not upon the effect to be given to it by a plea of former recovery
or any other matter dehors the record."
"Bitzer v. Shunk and Harper v. Fox, supra, note 2.
,Supra, note ii.
1572 Pa. 1o4 (i872).
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This conclusion was not without precedent, for more than
a quarter of a century, prior to this, in Withers v. Livezey,' 6 Justice Kennedy said:
"It seems that a judgment entered by confession of one
partner against another without authority from such other, is
merely voidable, and, therefore, must be considered valid until
vacated or set aside by the court, upon application by the defendant."
In other words, it is a valid partnership matter, unless
brought into question by the non-assenting partner, and by him
alone, as was said in Grier v. Hood:'7
"It is only the non-assenting partner that can question the
validity of the judgment and this because, as was said in Harper v. Fox, the judgment, if permitted to stand, would bind his
person and separate estate."
The reasoning in this case is certainly foreign to the "entity" theory of partnership, as expressed by the court in Boyd v.
Thompson and Coxe.
As to the distribution of a fund so obtained, no cases dealing
squarely with this question can be found; the only mention being
made is in the case of York Bank's Appeal.'8 Here John A.
Nevin confessed a judgment on behalf of himself and the firm
of Pflieger, Hess and Nevin, in favor of the York Bank. A motion was then made by John Pflieger and Sallie A. Hess to set
aside the judgment as to them, on the ground that they did not
join in the execution of the notes on which the judgments were
entered, and the court then ordered:
"That the judgment shall not effect or be a lien or incumbrance upon the separate estate, real or personal, of John
Pflieger and Sallie A. Hess, two of the members of the firm of
Pflieger, Hess & Nevin, nor upon the partnership account, real
or personal, of the firm of Pflieger, Hess & Nevin, but only
upon the separate and individual real or personal estate of
John A. Nevin, who confessed the same."
Under this decree, the entire partnership property was sold
and Nevin's interest was ascertained to be a little over two thou6'

W. & S. 433 (1841).

Pa. 43o
is36 Pa. 458 (1855).
(186o).
?25
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sand five hundred dollars. This fund and no more was demanded by the York Bank as a result of the above decree, and
the case then came up before the Supreme Court upon the question whether an improper entry of the Christian names in the
judgment index binds a subsequent judgment creditor when lie
has notice of the prior lien, to which the Supreme Court answered
in the affirmative. So well established was the principle of law,
that the judgment creditor, under such an execution can only take
the individual's interest who confessed the judgment, that the
point was not even raised upon argument before the Supreme
Court, for no mention of it is made in the report. Therefore,
this case, in conjunction with Knieb v. Graves,19 clearly establish the principle "that for the purposes of execution, such judgment would be sustained against the goods of the partnership,"
as quoted in all the subsequent cases, to mean only as a rule of
practice and no more, in which the entire partnership property
is sold under such judgment, but only the interest of the individual who confessed the judgment is apportioned to such creditor. 20
All cases dealing with the question of a partnership judgment confessed by one partner only, can be classified under two
groups:
i. Those in which plaintiff proceeds to recover directly under his judgment; and,
2. Those in which plaintiff maintains an action in assumpsit
under such notes.
And both these groups are governed by a further classification of
(a) Direct ratification by the non-assenting partner; or,
(b) Indirect acquiescence by the non-assenting partner.
With
very easy
ject, with
partner is

these classifications as a guiding point, it becomes a
matter to differentiate the various cases on this subespecial reference to those in which the non-assenting
held liable.

"Supra, note 15.
" Similar to the practice under the Act of April 8, 1873, P. L. 65, where
the judgment is individual and only against one of the partners.
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A risionj of the cases leads us to the conclusion that the nonassenting partner is not individually bound by such a confession
of judgment. But the judgment itself as an effectual process, is
not wholly void, "but merely voidable, and, therefore, must be
considered valid until vacated or set aside by the court, upon
application by the defendant."' 2' And "it is only the non-assent' 22
ing partner that can question the validity of the judgment.
The fact that it may have been given for a partnership debt
24
is immaterial, 23 unless there is evidence of assent or ratification.

For it has been held that the non-assenting partner may waive
this defence, which is peculiarly his, by express ratification or
silent acquiescence ;2' and too long a delay in exercising an
option under the partnership contract may be construed as a
"ratification. ' 26 Therefore, we can conclude that the plaintiff
must do two things in order to validate such a note.
First: He must perfect the unauthorized confession of judgment, by proving that the non-assenting partner did
ratify or acquiesce in such judgment; and,
Second: Having accomplished this, the plaintiff cannot rest
here, but must proceed further and show that such
note was given for a partnership obligation, as the
27
law does not presume the partnership indebtedness.
The plaintiff, on the other hand, must stand or fall upon the
validity of such a note. He cannot raise the curtain and allow
the court to view the scene of the transaction. 28 And this is correct, for the plaintiff had various other opportunities with which
to enforce his demands, such as proceeding under his "book account,' "cash money loaned" or "partnership promissory notes,"
"Withers v. Livezey, supra, note 16.
" Grier v. Hood, supra, note 17.
"McCleary v. Thompson, supra, note 3.
24 Feighens v. Sobers, 239 Pa. 284 (1913).
Grier v. Hood, supra, note 17. Myers v. Sprenkle, 20 Sup. 549 (1902).
-Evans v. Watts, 192 Pa. 112 (1899).
Ellinger's Appeal, 7 Atl. Rep. i8o (i896). Ellinger's Appeal is much
stronger, for in that case both partners did actually sign the note.
"Funk v. Young, 241 Pa. 72 (913).
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as the case may be. But instead, he voluntarily chose to accept
this tainted judgment note. With knowledge of the fact that
the debtors constituted a partnership, he voluntarily chose to
receive a preferential evidence of his indebtedness, from only
one of the partners. Surely, if such firm creditor attempted to
obtain the highest possible security, the burden was upon him to
see that it was done most effectively, and the fact that only one
partner signed such judgment note, should lead the court to act
with considerable caution.
The foregoing analysis of the cases dealing with the confession of a partnership judgment, by only one partner, we believe,
will reconcile all apparent conflict of authorities, and will make
the long line of decisions from Girard v. Basse,20 down to the
recent case of Funk v. Young,3 0 unbroken and uniform. The difficulty injected into the law was caused by the court attempting
in Boyd v. Thompson and Coxe3 l to treat a question of practice
as a matter of substantive law. But happily, this case, too, upon
a careful analysis trails in line with all the other authorities.
A. E. Hurshman.
Philadelphia.
2

f 'Supra, note i.
'o Supra, note 28.

"Supra, note 4.

